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Summary :  
 
The aim of this paper is to study the relation between governance and migration in the 
case of a South-North partnership, using the tools of economic analysis. We will analyse both 
the governance of migratory phenomenon (i.e. the control of South-North migration, as much 
as the control of rural-urban or internal migration) and the consequences of internal and/or 
international migrations on a broader problem which is the compatibility of economic 
liberalization, political stability and other objectives which are pursued by governments (such 
as avoiding the deterioration of social capital, or a social dumping). In a first section we 
develop an original Harris-Todaro model in order to resolve the question of the compatibility 
of different policies. In a second section we will consider four possibilities to enrich the 
Harris-Todaro model, which are to take into account the cost of migration, the attitude toward 
risk, the relative deprivation hypothesis, and the relation between migration and social capital. 
In each case, our attention will be focused on the policy recommendations we can formulate 
as a result of every approach. 
 
 




JEL Codes :   F13, F22, Q17, Z13 
                                                 
1 This research is a part of a European research contract n° 028386 named «  The Political Economy of 
Governance in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership » (Go-EuroMed). 
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The aim of this paper is to study the relation between governance and migration in the 
case of a South-North partnership, using the tools of economic analysis. We will analyse both 
the governance of migratory phenomenon (i.e. the control of South-North migration, as much 
as the control of rural-urban or internal migration) and the consequences of internal and/or 
international migrations on a broader problem which is the compatibility of economic 
liberalization, political stability and other objectives which are pursued by governments (such 
as avoiding the deterioration of social capital, or a social dumping). So, the field of our 
research is not only the governance of migration, but also the constraints that migration is 
setting in the economic and political governance. In order to attain our objective, we will use 
a Harris-Todaro-Fields model in section 1 and we will complete this approach in section 2. In 
the model of section 1, the main reason for migration is to equalize the expected income 
between sectors. This model leads to an original statement about the compatibility of various 
policies in an economy where Harris-Todaro type migration takes place. In the second section 
we will consider four possibilities to enrich the Harris-Todaro model, which are to take into 
account the cost of migration, the attitude toward risk, the relative deprivation hypothesis, and 
the relation between migration and social capital. In each case, our attention will be focused 
on the policy recommendations we can formulate as a result of every approach. In section 3 
we present a table which summarizes our main results. 
 
 
1 – The lessons of a Harris-Todaro model 
 
In this section, we will use a simple Harris-Todaro model in order to demonstrate the 
incompatibility of various objectives such as agricultural liberalization, social clause, the 
control of south-north migration, political stability and budgetary equilibrium. In the first 
section we define the model, then in the second section we analyze the effects of several 
policies and in the third section we focus on the practical lessons of the model.  
 
1-1  The model 
 
The model represents an economy producing two goods, one manufactured good and 
one agricultural good. The manufactured good can be produced in the formal sector or in the 
informal sector. The formal sector uses a fix amount of capital and pay taxes. Besides, the 
formal sector is constrained by a real minimum wage. The informal sector is composed of 
small individual producers who share equally the real amount of activity of the sector. The 
entrepreneurs in the informal sector don’t pay taxes, but they sell their product at the same 
price as the formal sector. The agricultural good is produced in the rural sector, which uses a 
fix amount of capital, pay taxes but which is not constrained by the minimum wage, following 
the tradition of Harris-Todaro models.  
The individuals are perfectly mobile between the three sectors, and they have also the 
possibility of emigrate without any costs and work in the foreign informal sector (we suppose 
here that all the emigration is illegal, so that the migrants will necessarily work in the informal 
sector abroad). The foreign informal sector is supposed to have a fix real size, which is 
determined exogenously. As a consequence of these assumptions, the individuals have the 
choice between four situations : 
 
- To work in the rural sector ; 
- To search a job in the (urban) formal sector, without any other activity than the search ; 
- To work part-time in the informal sector and search at the same time a formal job ; 
- To emigrate and work in the informal sector abroad. 
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The fundamental hypothesis is that the individuals are going to migrate between the four 
sectors until the equalization of expected income of the four sectors (rural, national formal, 
national informal and foreign informal). We suppose the individuals are risk-neutrals and we 
focus on the no-migration equilibria, i.e. the equilibria where the expected income is the same 
in all sectors.  
 
We then use the following notations :  
wa : real wage in the agricultural sector. 
wu : real wage (fixed institutionally) in the urban sector. In fact, wu is the real minimum wage. 
It is supposed that the real minimum wage is higher than the wage that equilibrates the formal 
urban labour market, so that there is urban unemployment. 
Qi : real size of the national informal sector 
Qe : real size of the foreign informal sector 
q : probability to find a formal job for an individual while seeking full-time. For an individual 
working in the informal sector and searching a formal job at the same time, this probability is 
h.q, with h<1 (see Fields).  
Lj, with j= a, i, e: population working respectively in the agricultural sector, informal national 
sector and foreign informal sector. 
Lu : individuals seeking full-time an urban formal work or having such a work 
Eu  : individuals working in the urban formal sector, Lu-Eu represents the unemployed 
population 
L : total population 
P : general price level 
pu
p and pa
p are the producer prices of the manufactured good and agricultural good 
pu
c and pa
c are the consumer prices of the manufactured good and agricultural good 
pu
m and pa
m are the world prices of the manufactured good and agricultural good 
α is the part of agricultural products in the consumption basket 
ta and tu are the sales taxes on the agricultural good and the manufactured good (only in the 
formal sector), da is the customs duty for the agricultural good. It is supposed that the customs 
duty is nil for the manufactured good. 
 
The following equations define the model equilibrium : 
 
wa = Pa. f'(La)           ( 1 )
2 
wa = q. wu          ( 2 )  
wa = h.q.wu + (1-hq).Qi / Li.         ( 3 )  
wa = Qe/Le           (4) 
wu = Pu. g'(Eu)           ( 5 )
3 
q =  Eu / (Lu+Li.h)         (6) 
La+Li+Lu+Le  =   L          ( 7 )  
Pa =  pa
p  /   P           ( 8 )  
Pu = pu
p  /   P           ( 9 )  
P = α. pa
c + (1-α). pu
c           ( 1 0 )  
pa
c = (1+ta). pa
p          ( 1 1 )  
pu
c = (1+tu). pu
p          ( 1 2 )  
pa
c = (1+ta).(1+da). pa
m         ( 1 3 )  
                                                 
2 we suppose f’ > 0  and f’’<0 
3 we suppose g’ > 0  and g’’<0 
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pu
c = (1+tu). pu
m           ( 1 4 )  
Qi = a.tu  +   b           ( 1 5 )  
 
Are exogenous : the functions f and g, the variables wu, h, Qe, L, α, pa
m, pu
m, ta, da, tu, a and b. 




c so that there is 15 
endogenous variables. 
 
Equations  1 and 5 result from the equality between nominal wage and the value of the 
marginal product in agricultural and manufactured formal sector. Equations 2 to 4 mean that 
in equilibrium expected income is identical in all sectors. There are two populations looking 
for a formal work : one population, which size is Lu, has a probability q of finding it and the 
other one, which size is Li, has a probability h.q. The mean probability for the two 
populations is Eu / (Lu+Li), so that we can deduce of the total probability formula the equation 
6. Equations 7 to 14 are accounting identities or definitions. Equation 15 means that the size 
of national informal sector is a linear function of tu, which is the tax on manufactured good. 
Note that “a” can be positive or negative, which means that a rise in tu can have a positive or a 
negative effect on Qi. Qi can also have an exogenous expansion, by changing the value of 
parameter « b ». 
 
It can be proved that : 
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       ( 1 7 )  
 
(4), (7), (16) and (17) imply : 
 
La + [Eu.wu + Qi + Qe] / [Pa.f'(La)] = [L+h.Qi / wu]      ( 1 8 )  
 
That is, if we note C the expression [Eu.wu + Qi + Qe] and D the expression [L+ h.Qi/wu] : 
La + C / [Pa.f'(La)] = D  or : 
C / Pa - F. f’(La) = 0  with F≡ (D-La)         ( 1 8 ' )  
 
It can be demonstrated that, in order to have Lu > Eu (which means that there is some people 

















        ( 1 9 )  
 
We will now analyse the case of an economy which liberalizes its agriculture. In this 
model, national agriculture is protected by a customs duty da and so national rural sector is 
having the advantage of a producer price above the world price for the agricultural good. As a 
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result, the labour force in the rural sector is important. So, when the liberalization takes place, 
the labour force will go from the countryside to the cities. But, from another point of view, the 
customs duty is a source of income for the government and so, in order to maintain fiscal 
equilibrium, it is necessary to raise the sales taxes. Thus, it is also necessary to study the 
consequences of a raise in taxes in order to analyse the effects of agricultural liberalization. 
 
1-2  The Policies and their consequences 
 
In this model, the main origin of migration process is the liberalization of agricultural 
sector, and, as long as fiscal equilibrium is an objective for the government, this liberalization 
may be accompanied by a raise in taxes to compensate the shortage of fiscal resource. So we 
will study in this section the effects of a decrease in da and the effects of an increase in ta 
and/or tu. Our attention will be concentrated on the migratory consequences and we will study 
the compatibility of this liberalization policy with others objectives that a government may 
have. 
 
1-2-1  Consequences of a decrease in da 
 
It is possible to demonstrate the following result : 
 
dEu / dda =  (dEu / dP).(dP / dpa
c).(dpa
c / dda) so that : 
Eu’(da) =  [α.wu. pa
m.(1+ta)] / [pu
p .g’’(Eu)]  <  0.      (20) 
 
dPa / dda = (dPa / dpa
p).(dpa
p /dda), so : 
dPa / dda =  [(1-α). pa
m .pu
c] / P
2, expression we will note « A », A > 0.    (21) 
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if and only if : 
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when α = 0 we get α.G(α) = 0 and when α = 1, α.G(α) = G(α) > 1. If we suppose that the 
function H(α) = α.G(α) is a continuous function monotonously increasing on [0, 1], there 
exists a α* ∈ [0, 1] such that if α < α* (α « small»), condition (23) is satisfied, while if α > 
α* (α « big »), condition (23) is violated. In order to have H(α) increasing on [0, 1] it is 
necessary and sufficient that H’ = α.G’ + G > 0, that means that the elasticity of G 
respectively to α must be superior to -1 (G’>0 or G’<0 but eG/α< 1).  
 
In addition, we show that : 
dLu/dda =  1/wa
2 . [ Eu’(da).wa.wu + (hQi/(1-h) - Eu.wu). dwa/dda  ]    (25) 
 
This expression is necessarily negative if dwa/dda is positive, i.e. under condition (24) (α 
small).  
Moreover, Le = Qe / wa (equation 4) thus : 
Sign (dLe/dda) = - Sign (dwa/dda).  
In equation (16) all the parameters are independent of da, except wa, thus: 
Sign (dLi/dda) = - Sign (dwa/dda). 
When  α violates condition (24) (α big) then dLi/dda, dLe/dda, dLa/dda are positive, then 
d(Li+Le+La)/dda is positive, and dLu/dda is negative (by virtue of (7)). It follows that, 
whatever is the value of α, dLu/dda is negative. 
 
In summary, if da decreases (liberalization of agriculture) : 
 
 L a L i L e L u E u 
α big  decreases decreases decreases increases increases 
α small  decreases increases increases increases increases 
 
When da decreases, internal (rural-urban) migration always increases (La always decreases, 
Lu+Li = L-(La+Le) always increases). By contrast, international migration Le can increase or 
decrease, depending on the value of α. When α is small, the liberalization has a positive effect 
on international migration, while it is the opposite when α is big. So we can say that trade and 
migration are complementary when α is small, while they are substitutable when α is big. 
 
A last question is how does (Lu – Eu) (the number of unemployed people) change when da 
lowers ? 
 
We can show that : 
 
[]
2 ). 1 (
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The first term of the numerator is necessarily negative, as Eu’(da) < 0 (cf. 20) while the 
second term may be negative or positive. That second term is composed by two factors. The 
first one, dwa/dda may be positive or negative, depending on whether α is (respectively) small 
or big (cf. supra equations 23 and 24), and the second one is necessarily negative if condition 
(19) holds. It results that if dwa/dda is positive (α small) Lu-Eu increases when da decreases, 
which means that agricultural liberalization increases the number of unemployed. When 
dwa/dda is negative, expression (26) has in the numerator a negative and a positive term. 
Expression (26) may then be positive, if the second (positive) term is bigger than the first one. 
 
In summary, we will have, if da decreases (liberalization of agriculture) : 
 
 L a L i L e L u L u - Eu 
α big  decreases decreases decreases increases ? 
α small  decreases increases increases increases increases 
 
 
1-2-2  Consequences of an increase in ta and tu 
 
Liberalization means a drop in the resources of the State, insofar as taxes on 
international trade are an important percentage of the resources of the State in several 
developing countries (see table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Structure of central government revenues in 2001 for 9 developing countries and mean values for Middle Income 
economies (as a percentage of total current revenue) 













Other Taxes  Non tax 
Revenue 
Algeria 70  0 8 11 1  10 
China 6  0  75  10 4  6 
Egypt (1997)  22  0  17  13 12  37 
India 29  0  29  18 0  24 
Jordan 12  0  36  17 10  24 
Mexico 34  10  62 4 1  10 
Morocco 24  5  36  16 3  16 
Tunisia 20  17  38  11 4  9 










17 31  37  3 1  10 
Source : World Development Indicators 2004  
 
It will be thus necessary to increase other taxes in order to compensate the reduction of 
resources coming from international trade. In this model, we examine the possibility of an 
increase in the sale taxes and the implications it will have on migrations. 
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1-2-2-1   Consequences  of an increase in ta.  
 
dLa/dta is given by equation (22) where we replace A by dPa/dta and Eu’ (da) by Eu’ (ta). In the 
same way, dwa/dta is given by equation (23) where we replace A et Eu’ (da) similarly. We also 
show that: 
dPa/dta = - α Pa
2 < 0   and   dEu/dta = [α.pa
p.wu] / [pu
p.g’’(Eu)] < 0 
 
dLa/dta can be negative or positive, but dwa/dta is necessarily negative. Negativity of dwa/dta 
implies positivity of dLe/dta and dLi/dta. That means that when we increase taxes on 
agricultural good, ceteris paribus, Le and Li also increase. 
 
Moreover, it can be shown that : 
Sign (dLa/dta)   = Sign (C. pu
p. g’’ (Eu) + wu
2. P) with C = [Eu.wu + Qi + Qe]    
 
g’’ (Eu) is by hypothesis negative so that the second expression has a negative term and a 
positive one. It is possible to demonstrate that a necessary and sufficient condition for dLa / 
dta to be negative is: 
Qi + Qe > - wu. [Eu+ g’ (Eu)/g’’ (Eu) ]          ( 2 7 )
4 
 
The intuitive interpretation of that condition is easy: when taxes increase, formal 
employment lowers (Eu’ (ta) negative). So, in order to have a decrease in the work force in 
agriculture, i.e. to permit a rural-urban migration, the size of informal emigration sectors (both 
national and foreign) must be big enough to absorb the migratory flow and offer an income 
level high enough to be attractive.  
 
In summary, when ta increases : 
 
 L a L i L e E u w a 
(27)  hold  decreases increases increases decreases  decreases 
(27) doesn’t hold  increases  increases increases decreases  decreases 
 
We can also note that d (Lu-Eu)/dta is given by equation (26) where we replace Eu’ (da) by Eu’ 
(ta) and dwa/dda by dwa/dta. Eu’ (ta) like Eu’ (da) is negative, but dwa/dta is necessarily negative, 
while dwa/dda may be positive or negative, depending on whether α is (respectively) small or 
big. As a consequence we cannot say in the general case if d (Lu-Eu)/dta is positive or 
negative. 
 
1-2-2-2  Consequences of an increase in tu 
 
It can be shown that : 
 
dPa / dtu  =  - [pa
p. pu
p. (1-α)] / P
2 < 0. We will call this expression X.  
dEu / dtu = [(1-α).wu] / [g’’(Eu)] < 0 . We will call this expression Y. 
 
Using (18’) and the implicit function theorem, we demonstrate that : 
 
                                                 
4 Note that a sufficient, but not necessary, condition of (27) is: Eu > - g’ (Eu) / g’’(Eu), i.e. function g’(Eu) must 
have an elasticity relatively to Eu inferior to -1 (superior to one in absolute value). Condition (27) may also be 
rewritten C / wu > -g’(Eu) / g’’(Eu), or F.q > -g’(Eu) / g’’(Eu).   
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=     (28) 
 
This expression is strictly negative if and only if : 
 
1 .





L f F X w Y
a
a u   = a1 
5          ( 2 9 )  
By replacing X et Y with their value, one gets : 
 
C. pu
p. g’’(Eu) + wu
2.   P   <   Z          ( 3 0 )  
 
with    
) 1 (





u E g q h P
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) (      ( 3 1 )  
 
This condition looks like condition (27) and is equivalent to (27) when a=0 (i.e. when Qi 
does not depend on tu). When a is positive, Z is also positive and the right member of (31) is 
smaller (g’’<0) than the right member of (27) : equation (31) may be satisfied even if (27) 
doesn’t hold. This means that when Qi depends positively on tu it is more frequent to have a 
raise of tu creating a rural-urban migration.  
 









P L f L f X
dt
dw
. ). ( " ) ( ' . + =         ( 3 2 )  
 
By replacing dLa/dtu by its value we obtain : 
 
[]
F L f L f







). ( " ) ( '




=       ( 3 3 )  
 
This is strictly positive if and only if : 
 
a > 
) . 1 ).( ( "
. ). ( " ) ( ' .
2
q h L f





 = a2 ≥0         (34) 
 
We demonstrate now that a2 ≥ a1 : 
Let us suppose the contrary : 
a1 > a2 implies f ’’ (La). F > f’ (La), but this is impossible as : f’ (La)  0  f’’ (L ≥ ≥ a). F. 
 
                                                 
5 a1 may be positive or negative. Condition (27) is necessary and sufficient to have a1 negative. When (27) holds, 
(29) is satisfied for any « a » superior or equal to zero and so dLa/dtu is always strictly negative. 
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It is a consequence of (4) that Le = Qe / wa, with Qe exogenous. As a result we have : 
Sgn (dLe / dtu) = - Sgn (dwa / dtu ) 
 
In Summary : 
 
Value of a  a < a1 a 1 < a < a2 a 2 < a 
Sign of (dLa / dtu) +  -  - 
Sign of (dwa / dtu) -  -  + 
Sign of (dLe / dtu) +  +  - 
 

















             
so  
2 ). 1 (















=         ( 3 5 )  
 





Q hq w a . ) 1 .( . − − > 0. 








F L f L f




). ( " ) ( '
) 1 .( ). ( "
         ( 3 6 )  
        
and so : 
 
0
). ( " ) ( '
)] ( " ). ( ) ( ' . ).[ 1 .(




F L f L f
L f C Q L f w hq a
dt
dw
Q hq w a
a a
a i a a
u
a
i a  (37) 
 





 > 0. 
 
In summary, when tu increases : 
 
 L a L i L e E u w a 
a < a1 increases  increases  increases  decreases  decreases 
a1 < a < a2 decreases increases  increases  decreases  decreases 
0  a ≤ 2 < a     decreases  increases  decreases  decreases  increases 
 
We can also note that d (Lu-Eu)/dtu is given by the second member of equation (26) where we 
replace Eu’ (da) by Eu’ (tu) and dwa/dda by dwa/dtu and to which we add a positive expression 
equal to [a.h
2/ (1-h).wu].  
Eu’ (tu) like Eu’ (da) is negative, and dwa/dtu may be positive or negative, depending on 
whether “a” is (respectively) superior or inferior to a2. As in the former case, the sign of d (Lu-
Eu)/dtu can be positive or negative. 
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1-2-3    Synthesis 
 
Let us analyze now the global effects of a drop in da financed by an increase in ta or tu.  
 
Case n°1 : a decrease in da financed by an increase in ta 
 
 L a L i L e E u 
α big, (27) satisfied 
« zone 1 » 
decreases ? ? ? 
α big, (27) not satisfied 
« zone 2 » 
?  ? ? ? 
α small,  (27) satisfied 
« zone 3 » 
decreases increases increases  ? 
α small, (27) not satisfied 
« zone 4 » 
? increases  increases  ? 
 
The undetermined cases are due to the fact that the two effects act contradictorily. 
However, when α is small we always see an increase of Li and Le, as well as a decrease in La 
whatever be α when (27) holds.  
 
Case n°2 : a decrease in da financed by an increase in tu 
 
 L a L i L e E u 
a<a1, α big  ? ? ? ? 
a1<a<a2, α big  decreases  ? ? ? 
a2<a, α big     decreases ? decreases ? 
a<a1, α small  ? increases  increases ? 
a1<a<a2, α small  decreases increases increases  ? 
a2<a, α small     decreases increases  ?  ? 
 
Here we insist on the value of α and that of “a”. Each time a>a1, the combined actions 
produce an increase in rural-urban migration. When α is small, the two actions always 
increase employment in informal sector. Besides, international migration necessarily increases 
for “small α countries”, as long as “a” is not too big (i.e., when a<a2). As a matter of fact, 
when “a” is very high, that means that national informal sector activity grows a lot as a result 
of an increase in taxes, and in consequence that sector is going to absorb the flow of migrants 
coming from the rural sector. Similarly, it is clear that “big α countries” with a big value of 
“a” (a>a2) will experience a decrease in international migration in the case we are studying.   
 
1-3   Intuitive interpretation and policy recommendations 
 
In this section we will give an intuitive interpretation of the results we have seen. Then, 
we will give some policy recommendations in order to illustrate what one can learn from a 
Harris-Todaro model like this one. Besides, we provide in annex the value of α, i.e. food 
expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure, for some countries. It is possible to see that 
South Mediterranean countries, with the exception maybe of Tunisia, have relatively high 
value of α, while countries with low values of α are mostly developed economies, or East-
European and Latin-American ones. 
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1-3-1   Intuitive functioning of the model 
 
1-3-1-1  The effect of a decrease in custom duties (da) 
 
The value of alpha affects the relation between agricultural liberalization and migrations 
by virtue of the following device : 
 
Case 1 : if alpha is big (at the limit, workers are uniquely paid in agricultural goods) 
 
- the cutting down of agricultural custom duties generates a drop in domestic agricultural 
prices, which provokes a rise of urban employment, this rise being stronger when agricultural 
goods have a bigger part in the consumption basket ;  
- if rural population (La) were set constant, rural real wage (wa) would not lower much , as Pa 
does not change a lot if alpha is close to one ; 
-  But the raise in urban employment increases the expected value of urban income, and that 
provokes an increase in rural-urban migration (La decreases) ; 
- The decrease of La generates an increase of wa, which reduces international emigration and 
emigration to national informal sector. 
 
Case 2 : if alpha is small (at the limit, workers are uniquely paid in manufactured goods) 
 
-  The drop in agricultural custom duties only moderately increases urban employment as the 
workers do not consume much agricultural goods ; 
- With a constant La, rural real wage (wa) decreases a lot, because the price of the agricultural 
good lowers and the workers consume essentially manufactured goods ; 
- The fall in wa together with the quasi-stagnation of urban formal employment increases the 
migratory pressure toward national and foreign informal sectors. 
 
The difference between the two cases is intuitively that : 
 
- In the first case (alpha is big), the increase in urban formal employment is big enough to 
absorb the migratory flow coming from the rural sector while in the second case (alpha is 
small), the expansion of urban formal sector is not big enough ;  
- In the first case, the domestic drop in agricultural prices does not decrease much real wage 
in the rural sector because the workers only consume the agricultural good they produce. In 
this case migratory pressure does not come from the worsening of rural situation, but from the 
improvement of the urban formal employment. The improvement of the urban formal 
employment generates positive effects on the rural sector and a decrease of informal 
employment, both foreign and national. 
- By contrast, in the second case (alpha is small), the workers produce an agricultural good 
whose price is lowering and consume essentially manufactured goods whose price is constant. 
The deterioration of internal terms of exchange (ratio of agricultural prices on manufactured 
prices) generates a decrease of real wages in the rural sector. On the opposite side, the urban 
formal sector does not experiment a notable expansion. The rural-urban migration is in this 
case the consequence of a deterioration of rural situation. As formal urban employment did 
not increase, that means an increase of foreign and national informal employment. 
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1-3-1-2  The effect of an increase in taxes 
 
It is important to make the difference between the case of an increase in taxes that affect 
the agricultural good and the case of a growth of the taxes that bear on the manufactured 
good. As a matter of fact, in the second case, the fiscal increase will have an expansive effect 
on the national informal sector, which will develop itself at the expense of the formal sector, 
while in the first case this effect will not appear. 
 
Case 1 : an increase in ta 
 
In order to have an increase in ta implying a decrease in rural employment, it is 
necessary and sufficient to have condition (C) satisfied, as demonstrated above (see equation 
27) : 
 
(C) : Qi + Qe > () u E φ , where Qi is the size of the national informal sector, Qe is the size of 
foreign informal sector (emigration sector), and Eu is urban formal employment.  
 
This condition means that an increase in agricultural taxes will not have a negative 
effect on rural employment unless the sum of the sizes of the foreign and national informal 
sectors is big enough. As a matter of fact, the increase in agricultural taxes generates an 
increase in wage costs and consequently a decrease in urban formal employment. It is thus 
necessary to have the informal sectors big enough to explain that the rural workers leave the 
countryside. 
 
Case 2 : an increase in tu 
 
In this case, Qi is not anymore exogenous as it varies in function of tu (when tu increases, 
Qi also increases). If we want to have L a decreasing in response to an increase in tu, it is 
necessary and sufficient to have Qi “sufficiently” sensitive to the variation in tu (in order to 
have (C) satisfied). So it is necessary to have "a" (i.e. dQi /dtu) “sufficiently” big in order to 
have the increase in tu provoking a decrease in La (rural employment). That explains the 
condition: a > a1. 
 
If we are interested in the evolution of international migration, the important point is the 
effect of the increase in tu on the real agricultural wage wa. This effect takes place by two 
channels: on one hand, the effect of tu on the general price level and, on the other hand, the 
effect of tu on rural employment La via its effect on Qi (cf. supra). We demonstrate that when 
a < a2 the sign of dwa/dtu is negative. As we have set that Le = Qe/ wa we can deduce that 
when a < a2, Le increases if tu increases (and inversely if a > a2). 
 
1-3-2 Policy  recommendations 
 
In order to make policy recommendations, we will identify first some goals that can be 
pursued by governments. A first goal could be political stability which can signify for the 
country of origin of emigration (let us say, the South) a low level of urban unemployment. 
Another objective could be as we have said budgetary equilibrium, so that a reduction in 
custom duties must be balanced by a raise in other taxes, such as sales taxes. Liberalization of 
trade is also an objective, and that includes liberalization of agricultural trade. From the point 
of view of destination country (the North) a control of immigration is also an objective, that 
could be for an economic reason (to impede a raise of unemployment in the North) or for a 
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sociological one (to prevent a drop in social capital). Finally we could identify “social clause” 
as an attempt to limit the size of informal sector in the South, insofar as informal sector does 
not respect any labor regulation and can have a salary level below the minimum wage. 
 
a) When alpha is “small”, liberalization of agricultural trade will foster international 
migration, will develop the national informal sector and will increase the number of 
unemployed people. If we finance the drop in custom duties by an agricultural tax, the effect 
of the raise in taxes will be to increase further emigration and national informal sector, and to 
decrease real rural wage and the number of people employed in urban formal sector. In 
summary, conditions are going to get worst but it will permit to maintain budgetary 
equilibrium. Things are similar when budgetary equilibrium is obtained thanks to a raise in 
manufactured sales tax tu, except when « a » is sufficiently big (a>a2≥0). This case means that 
Qi (size of national informal sector) is positively related and sufficiently sensitive to tu, so that 
the expansion of national informal sector in response of a raise in tu will be sufficient to 
absorb the rural-urban migration, and emigration toward foreign informal sector could 
decrease (but not necessarily, since the effect of a drop in da, ceteris paribus, is an increase in 
international migration).  
 
In the case of a “small alpha country”, liberalization of agricultural products is not 
consistent with other objectives like budgetary equilibrium, control of migrations and social 
clause. It is possible to maintain liberalization and budgetary equilibrium if we remove the 
objectives of control of migration and social clause. If we finance the reduction in custom 
duties by a raise in tu and if the size of national informal sector is positively related and 
sufficiently sensitive to tu it is possible to have an expansion of informal sector big enough to 
avoid an increase in international migration. So the lesson of the model is that in the case of a 
East-European country or a Latin American country, where α is likely to be small, it is 
difficult to pursue at the same time the objectives of a control of migration, liberalization, 
budgetary equilibrium, and reduction of national informal sector (as a kind of “social clause”). 
 
b) When alpha is big, as in the case of South-Mediterranean countries for example, 
situation is better. As a matter of fact, when α  is big, liberalization of agriculture is 
compatible with a decrease in international emigration and in the size of informal sector, and 
it does not necessarily imply an increase in the number of unemployed. Taking into account 
the effects of a rise in taxes the previsions may be less optimistic, since the increase in sales 
taxes will generally have a expansive effect on the informal sector and the international 
migration (except in the case of a high positive value of “a”, i.e. a>a2≥0, where international 
migration can decrease). So the combined effect of a reduction in custom duties and an 
increase in sales taxes is not clear. Nevertheless, even if the combined effect is not going in 
the sense of a better control of migration and a lesser size of informal sector, it is possible to 
drop the budgetary equilibrium objective, and still pursue the three others.   
 
 
2 – The teaching of new approaches of migrations 
 
The model developed above is based on the Harris-Todaro tradition, so, the only reason 
to migrate is a difference between the expected value of income in various sectors. Now, we 
will intend to complete the preceding approach by considering four aspects which are not 
present in the Harris-Todaro framework: the cost of migration (section 2-1), the attitude 
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toward risk (section 2-2), the relative deprivation hypothesis (section 2-3) and the role of 
social capital (section 2-4).  
 




To migrate is not free, it is thus necessary to take into account the cost of migrating, in 
particular in order to define if, when a developing country get richer, migration decrease or 
increase. It is clear that when a country becomes richer, its inhabitants have less incitation to 
migrate, but, at the same time, they are more capable to assume the cost of migration. We will 
see this phenomenon in a model inspired by Schiff (1994). 
 
Let us suppose that there are two goods : 
 
- one durable and indivisible, capital good 
- one perishable, consumption good 
 
The individuals are paid in perishable goods. The perishable good produced in year y 
can be stored during the entire year y but completely disappears in y+1. So the only way to 
store goods for more than one year is to convert them into the durable good. The durable good 
is indivisible and one unit of this good costs x units of perishable good. So in order to store 
wealth it is necessary to save at least x units of perishable goods, because if not, it is not 
possible to convert perishable goods in durable good. The durable good is a capital good, and 
so, detention of one unit of durable good give each period r.x units of perishable goods to its 
bearer, r being the rate of interest.  
 
There are two countries in this model : the South and the North. In the South, the annual 
wage is Ws, while in the North, it is Wn with Wn> Ws. In order to stay alive, an individual 
must spend Wp, which means that Wp is the wage of subsistence. We suppose Ws> Wp. If [Ws 
- Wp] is inferior to x, it is not worth saving because the quantity of perishable good that can be 
saved is not enough to buy a durable good. So, it is more rational to consume the whole salary 
Ws. But if [Ws - Wp] exceeds x, it may be a good strategy to save and buy one or more units 
of durable good.  
 
In this model it is possible to migrate from the South to the North in order to have the 
benefit of a higher salary, but migration has a cost. We suppose for simplicity that cost of 
migration is one unit of durable good. So, in order to migrate, an individual must save x units 
of perishable good, buy one unit of durable good and use it to pay the cost of migration. We 
have supposed that salary in the North is higher than salary in the South, so that [Wn - Ws] > 0, 
but if this difference is inferior to r.x, i.e. if Wn < Ws + r.x it is not rational to migrate, as the 
cost of migration is one unit of durable good, and detention of one unit of durable good gives 
r.x unit of perishable goods as an interest at each period. So if  Wn < Ws + r.x the better 
strategy is not to migrate, but rather to buy one unit of durable good and keep it, while 
working in the South for a wage Ws. At the opposite, if Wn > Ws + r.x it is more rational to 
use the unit of durable good in order to pay the cost of migration, and enjoy a salary of Wn 
rather than Ws + r.x. So, in summary, there are three possible situations : 
 
Case 1 : [Ws - Wp] < x : the individual cannot afford to migrate 
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Case 2 : Wn – r.x > Ws > Wp + x: the individual can pay the cost of migration and has an 
advantage in migrating, so that he or she migrates from South to North 
 
Case 3 : Ws > Wp + x and Ws > Wn – r.x: the individual could pay for migration but he prefers 
to buy one unit of durable good and keep it, and work in the South. In this case, the individual 
will not migrate.  
 
Note that it is possible to have Wp + x > Wn – r.x, or x.(1+r) > Wn – Wp > 0, so that case 
2 do not even exist. But this means that Wn  is very close to subsistence wage, and/or that cost 
of migration x is very high and/or the rate of interest r is very high. If this is not the case, case 
2 will exist. 
Note also that it is possible to have [Ws - Wp] ≥ 2.x, and in that case it will be possible 
for an individual in the South to buy two durable goods or more. In this case, the decision will 
still be to migrate if Ws < Wn – r.x and to stay in the South if Ws > Wn – r.x. As a matter of 
fact, if we have [Ws - Wp] = n.x (with n a natural number), the individual who migrates will 
have a revenue of Wn + (n-1).rx and the individual who does not migrate will have Ws + n.r.x, 
so that the agent will migrate if Ws < Wn – r.x. 
 
If case 2 exists, it is clear that when South Country is getting richer, so that the salary 
Ws increases and get closer to Wn, there will be two stages in migration : 
 
Stage 1 (case 1) : there is no migration 
Stage 2 (case 2) : migration increases as the southern country get richer and can afford the 
migration cost 
Stage 3 (case 3) : migration stops when migration is not any more attractive because the 
difference between the salary in the South and the salary in the North is not sufficient to 
compensate the cost of migrating. 
 
Let us now illustrate the model by a numerical example : we suppose that Wp=10 and 
Wn=50, the other values change as indicate in table 2 : 
 
Table 2 
Numerical example on costs of migration 
x=20 and r=20 %  x=30 and r=50 % 
Value of 
Ws 
Decision of migration or no-migration  Value of 
Ws 




[Ws-Wp] = 10 < x : the individuals 
cannot afford to migrate 
20 
(stage 1) 
[Ws-Wp] = 10 < x : the individuals 
cannot afford to migrate 
35 
(stage 2) 





Ws > W n– r.x = 46 > Wp+ x = 30: 
individuals have no more incentive to 




Ws > Wp+x = 40> Wn  – r.x = 35: 
individuals can pay the cost of 
migration but they have no incentive 
to migrate because they can earn 60 
= Ws+ r.x being in the South while 
only 50 in the North. 
2-1-2 Policy  recommendations 
 
If we suppose that case 2 exists, i.e. if we suppose that the salary in the North is not too 
close to subsistence wage, if the cost of migration is not too high relatively to the northern 
salary, and if interest rate is not too high either, then, when the salary in the South increases, 
migration will raise first and then will stop. So during what we have called "stage 2", there is 
  16 
a temporary increase in migration. In stage 3, migration stops, but there is no return 
migration, so the global effect of the process is a permanent increase in the stock of migrants 
in the North. As a result, more trade will imply more migration because free trade will imply 
an increase in the southern salary (factor price equalization). So, it appears that when cost of 
migration is taken into account, trade and migrations are complementary and not substitutable 
as it was the case in the classic model of Mundell (1957).  
 




In the basic Harris-Todaro model, going from rural sector to urban sector is renouncing 
to certainty in order to take a risk. As a matter of fact, the income in the rural sector is 
supposed to be known with certainty, while in the urban sector, an individual has a certain 
probability to get a formal job and a certain probability to be unemployed. In spite of that, it 
can be sustained that an individual could be induced to leave the countryside, even if he is 
risk-adverse, if there is a sufficient risk-premium, i.e. if the formal wage is big enough. Fields 
(1975) note for example that the urban income is frequently two times more than the rural 
revenue, and that the employment rate is rarely inferior to 80 % in the city. So if an individual 
has a utility function in the uncertainty u(x) =  x  and if y is the rural income, the expected 
utility in urban activity is 0.8 y 2 , which is equal to 1.13 y  and is superior to y .  
 
Nevertheless, the vision of rural activity as risk-free is obviously misleading. Levhari 
and Stark (1982) or Stark (1991) note that rural activity is risky, because revenues depend on 
climatic conditions which are intrinsically variables. On the other hand, urban activity is risky 
on the short term, but after a first phase of job search, it provides a salary probably more 
stable than in the countryside, and, so, going to the city could be viewed on the long term as a 
diminution of risk. So, risk adverse individuals could be incited to migrate if they don’t 
discount too much future utilities.  
 
This point of view can be illustrated by an example : 
 
(i) in case of migration, the revenue is 100 if one finds a formal work and of 20 if one does 
not find such a job. The probability of finding a formal work is supposed to be of 50 % on the 
short term but it is 80 % in the long run.  
(ii) in case of no-migration, the income is 60 with a probability of 50 % and of 40 with the 
complementary probability, in the short run or in the long run. 
Let us suppose the individual discount future utilities with a factor β and that the utility 
function is u(x) = Ln (x), the individual will have to choose between : 
 
-  in case of migration a utility of 0.5. Ln (100) + 0.5. Ln (20) + β. [0.8. Ln (100) + 0.2. Ln 
(20)] = 3.80 + 4.28. β 
-  in case of no-migration : 0.5. Ln (60) + 0.5. Ln (240) + β. [0.5. Ln (60) + 0.2. Ln (40)] = 
3.89 + 3.89. β 
 
So that the individual will migrate if and only if β > 0.23, that is, if he does not discount 
« too much » future utilities.  
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Another aspect of the relation between migration and risk is that migration is not 
necessarily an individual decision, but rather a decision that involves a larger entity like 
family. The migration of one of its member can be a risk-diversification strategy for a family 
entity. As a matter of fact, agricultural activity is, by nature, dependent of climatic conditions 
and so it is risky. If the farmers are not allowed to insure themselves against climatic risk, and 
if they are risk-adverse, a possible strategy to diversify risk is to send to the city some of the 
individuals that compose the family. That will bring to the family a new source of income, not 
correlated with the original agricultural activity. Another possibility is to send people abroad, 
for example in a more developed country (as United States for a Mexican household, or 
European Union for a South-Mediterranean family). So, migration of some individuals to a 
city or to another country, followed by remittances sent home by the migrants, will permit a 
diversification of the risk incurred by the family entity.  
 
2-2-2 Policy  recommendations 
 
If migration is related to risk management, control of migration needs a reflexion about 
the factors which affect the activity in the sectors or the countries which send migrants. So, a 
better access to insurance could be a substitute to migration. As a matter of fact, migration has 
a high cost –both financial and emotional- for the family who send people to another sector or 
another country. Migration has also, eventually, a certain cost for the sector or the economy 
which receives migrants. So it seems possible to improve the situation by offering financial 
instruments (insurance contracts) to families which need to diminish their exposition to risk. 
One possibility could be to develop micro-insurance contracts more adapted to the needs of 
little farmers of developing countries, so that it would not be necessary for them to diversify 
the sources of income of the family by migrating and receiving remittances. 
 




Stark and Yitzhaki (1988), Stark (1991) and Stark and Taylor (1991) note that 
individuals do not migrate uniquely in response to “absolute income” consideration but also in 
response to “relative deprivation” or “relative income” considerations. That means that an 
individual is not only looking for improving his absolute income, but also he is willing to 
improve his relative situation in a “reference group”. The “reference group” is originally the 
sending sector, i.e. the village, or the neighborhood, where migrants have their origin. As a 
matter of fact, migration can be a manner to make better the relative position of the family or 
the household in the origin group, by sending some of its members to a city or a Northern 
country. It is not even necessary to consider the family or the household as the decisional unit 
to make use of the concept of relative deprivation in economics of migration. An individual 
who migrates can still consider his village of origin as his “reference group”, because he can 
for example be considered by the other members of his village as someone “who succeed” 
and he can demonstrate his relative success by sending remittances or by spending money 
when he returns home.  A problem can emerge if the “reference group” changes when the 
migrants are better integrated in the receiving sector, but this problem is likely to appear only 
after a long period of time, and it will not appear at all in the case of seasonal migrants who 
come and go between the sector of origin and the place of temporary immigration. It is 
relevant to distinguish two issues in this approach : the problem of the measurement of 
relative deprivation, and the problem of the change of reference group. 
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First, let us consider the issue of how to measure relative deprivation. The idea is that 
we need at least two kinds of indicators, “numeric” indicators, which will measure for 
example the number of persons richer than I, and “volumetric” indicators, which will measure 
how much I am relatively deprived. Of course, a good synthetic indicator will depend at the 
same time of the first magnitude (the percentage of the population whose income is greater 
than mine) and the second one (average gap between the income of people richer than I and 
my own revenue). In consequence, we can use as an indicator of relative deprivation an 
indicator like PR : 
 
PR (y) = {1-F(y)}. {E (z-y | z>y)} 
 
Where F(y) is the cumulative distribution function of income, and consequently 1-F(y) 
is the percentage of individuals who have an income superior to y, and E (z-y | z>y) is the 
expected value of the difference (z-y) for the revenues z superior to y. PR(y), the relative 
deprivation of an individual having an income y, is thus equal to the product of a numeric 
indicator by a volumetric indicator. To illustrate that, let us take the example of Stark and 
Taylor (1991) : 
 
We have an economy composed by a city and a village. Each inhabitant of the village at 
time t has an income of 100, while each city dweller has an income of 200. If we suppose that 
for inhabitants of the village, reference group is the village, relative deprivation will be nil for 
them and so they will not migrate, in spite of the difference of income between the village and 
the city. Now we suppose that at time t+1 one half of the inhabitants have a raise of their 
income which becomes 150. Relative deprivation of the inhabitants whose income stays equal 
to 100 is ½. (150-100) = 25. One possibility for these households relatively deprived will be 
to send half of each household to the city, so that these households will reach an average 
income of ½. (100+200) = 150. Migration will then make relative deprivation equal to zero. 
The interesting point is that the average gap between city and village is smaller at t+1 than it 
was at t, but migration has begun only at t+1.  
 
We turn now to the problem of the “reference group”. After a while, migrants may stop 
referring themselves to their village of origin and adopt the environment where they live as 
their new reference group. Obviously, this change is more likely to happen when migration is 
permanent and not transient (for example seasonal), and it will take a certain time after the 
migrant has established himself in his new environment. But it is also probable that change of 
reference group will be easier and faster when receiving sector is culturally close to sending 
sector. Stark (1991) and Stark and Taylor (1991) think that cultural and social differences 
make difficult a change of reference group in the case of international migrants. International 
migrants will then continue referring themselves to their group of origin, at least until their 
integration to the receiving country is complete. That will take a lot of time, and that will be 
longer when migrants of a same origin stay together in their receiving country, which is often 
the case.  
 
The change of reference group is more frequent in the case of internal (rural-urban) 
migration, because in this case cultural differences are minimal. In this case, “return 
migration” will be more frequent, because after they change their reference group, individuals 
may experiment a relative deprivation more important in the city than the deprivation they 
used to have in their village of origin. Return migration will then occur as a strategy to 
diminish relative deprivation, even if it implies a decrease in absolute income. In a lot of cases 
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the returning migrant has, when he returns, a better relative position than before his initial 
migration, because he has constituted a patrimony while he was working far from home. 
 
2-3-2 Policy  recommendations 
 
Relative deprivation hypothesis implies that inequality in distribution of income is also 
an important explanation for migration. If the individuals are sensitive not only to their 
absolute revenue but also to the difference between what they have and what the others 
possess, the important point is not so much the difference of income between the sending 
sector and the receiving sector, but rather the inequality in the distribution of income inside 
the reference group. So, in order to control migratory flows, it may be important to control the 
level of inequality in the potentially sending sectors, for example the Southern Countries if we 
consider international migration. If one believes in the Kuznets hypothesis of an inverted U 
curve between GDP per capita and inequality, it is possible to deduce from relative 
deprivation hypothesis that middle income countries (more unequal) are more likely to send 
migrants than low income countries.  
 




Social capital "refers to the norms and networks that enable collective action" (website 
of the World Bank) and "is generally referred to as the set of trust, institutions, social norms, 
social networks, and organizations that shape the interactions of actors within a society and 
are an asset for the individual and collective production of well-being" (Fabio Sabatini's 
definition at www.socialcapitalgateway.org). In the 80's, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu 
has defined social capital as "the set of actual or potential resources that are associated with 
the possession of a durable network of relationships (…) or, in other terms, with the 
membership of a group" (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 2). Other definition is Schiff's who defines social 
capital as "the set of elements of the social structure that affect relations among people and are 
inputs or arguments of the utility and/or production function" (Schiff, 2002, p. 88). It is easily 
understandable that migrations are linked to social capital. As a matter of fact, social capital 
can be theorized by the capacity of the individuals to cooperate, as it is developed in various 
articles which use the formalism of theory of repeated games (see Annen, 2003, Dayton-
Johnson, 2003, or Routledge and Von Amsberg, 2003, among others). Migrations can 
negatively affects social capital by diminishing incitation to cooperate : why should I 
cooperate today if I am going to migrate tomorrow and if I will never meet again the people I 
am playing with today ? If one has to play again with the same players as today, and if 
individuals are punished in the future when they choose an aggressive strategy, "Folk 
Theorem" tell us that players (if they don't have a too high preference for present) will choose 
to cooperate in equilibrium. But if agents are continually changing of location, and thus if 
they have a very low probability to meet again in the future, this result is not valid anymore. 
This idea is summarized by E. Miguel who writes in his commentary of the article by 
Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) : "Trust and Social Capital are undermined by extensive 
labour mobility, as individuals are no longer able to engage in the long term reciprocal 
relationships that nurture community cooperation" (p. 196). That creates a problem because 
"while social capital is critical in promoting economic growth, growth may destroy social 
capital" (ibid., p. 196), insofar as "growing societies periodically experience large 
technological shocks that generate pressure for labour mobility" (ibid, p. 195).  
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So, a first kind of problem is the influence of labour migration on social capital, which 
has been studied by Maurice Schiff in various articles (see Schiff, 1999 a, 1999 b and 2002). 
Schiff note that migration is considered as a major issue by most governments, but economic 
theory often considers free trade and free migration as equivalent. If free trade is desirable, 
why free migration shouldn't be desirable as well ? How can we explain this difference ? The 
point made by Schiff is that free migration is different from free trade because migrations 
affect social capital. The effect of migration on social capital appears in both the countries of 
emigration and immigration. In the sending country, social capital decreases with the level of 
migration "because of the reduction in the size of the group of people of similar background 
and values with whom each member of the group can interact" (Schiff, 2002, p. 92), which 
means in other words that "emigration results in a social capital drain" (ibid.). In the receiving 
country, social capital depends also negatively on migration, because migration affects the 
capacity of the members of society to share the same values and/or to communicate. If social 
capital is the ability and willingness of the members of society to act together for a common 
goal, the existence of a migrant population beside the native group can have two negative 
effects: the first effect alters the ability to act in common, because, for example, migrants may 
speak another language than natives and the second effect is related to the willingness to act 
in common, because the two populations may have different values, for example a different 
religion.  
 
A second kind of problem has been studied by Massey (see Massey et alii, 1987, or 
Massey, 1999) and Zabin et alii (1993) and is related with the influence of social capital, or 
social networks, on migrations. We know that "migrants' networks", i.e. existence in an 
immigration sector (e.g. a Northern country, or a big city in a developing country) of an 
important community proceeding from a precise origin (for example a region, or a village), 
allied with a structure of relationships ("social capital") which links all the migrants the one 
with another and with the persons who are still in the sector of origin, fosters migration and 
shapes it in a specific way. So, economic determinants are not the only ones in motion when 
migrants are determining the destination they are going to take. The orientations of the flows 
of migrants are also dependent of the social networks already existing in the potential 
receiving sectors. Douglas Massey (1999) describes this phenomenon in these terms: 
"However an immigration stream begins, it displays a strong tendency to continue because of 
the growth and elaboration of migrants' networks (social capital theory). The concentration of 
immigrants in certain destination areas creates a "family and friends" effect that channels later 
streams of immigrants to the same places and facilitates their arrival and integration." (p. 
306). Numerous examples can be made of that phenomenon, as the Mexican migration to the 
United States, or Chinese migrants' networks around the world. 
  
2-4-2 Policy  recommendations 
 
We can deduce of the precedent theories two kinds of policy recommendations. On one 
hand, migration is not only an economic phenomenon, and so, it is not equivalent to free trade 
of goods or to free movements of capital. When people change of location, it destroys social 
networks formerly existing in the sending places and it affects social capital in the receiving 
sectors. So, migration must be managed cautiously. On the other hand, when networks of 
migrants have been established, migration is likely to continue even if initial incitation to 
migrate has disappeared. Thus, it is not necessarily sufficient to make economic incitation 
disappear to stop the migratory phenomenon. 
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3 – Synthesis 
 
We can summarize the main results of section 1 and 2 in the following table : 
 
Table 3 
Summary of the findings 
 





Individuals migrate in response to a 
difference in the expected income 
between sectors. We study the no-
migration equilibrium. The model is 
an exercise of comparative static, 
comparing the equilibrium after an 
initial change which is liberalization 
of agriculture 
When the part of agricultural products in 
total expenditure is low, liberalization may 
provoke an increase in migration, in the 
number of people employed in the informal 
sector, and a decrease in agricultural salary. 
So it will be difficult to have at the same time 
control on migration, decrease of informality, 
liberalization of trade and political stability. 
When the part of agricultural products is high 
the compatibility of these objectives is 
greater but the budgetary equilibrium 
objective is still difficult to attain at the same 




The models in this tradition take 
into account the fact that migration 
is not free and that it generates 
costs, both financial and emotional. 
The financial cost is easier to 
assume when sending country gets 
richer 
When cost of migration is taken into account, 
we will frequently have complementarity 
between migration and trade, and so 
liberalization will lead to an permanent 




Migration can be a strategy of risk 
avoidance and not of risk taking. 
This can be explained by 
considering that in the long run the 
revenue in the city is less risky than 
in the rural activity, or by supposing 
that migration is the strategy of a 
family which has a diversification 
strategy by sending some of its 
member to the city. 
Migration can be a form of insurance for a 
family entity. As a matter of fact, by sending 
some of its members abroad, the family is 
diversifying its sources of revenue and so it 
diminishes its risk. In order to control 
migration, we could propose to families 
micro-insurance contracts that fit better their 





Migration can be a response not to a 
low absolute income but to a low 
relative income.  
If individuals are sensitive not only to their 
absolute income but also to the difference 
between what they have and what the others 
possess, the important point is not so much 
the difference of income between the sending 
sector and the receiving sector, but rather the 
inequality in the distribution of income inside 
the reference group. So, in order to control 
migratory flows, it may be important to 
control the level of inequality in the 





Social capital, i.e. networks, can 
have an influence on migration, and 
reciprocally migration can influence 
social capital. 
First, migration is not only an economic 
phenomenon, and so, it is not equivalent to 
free trade of goods or free movements of 
capital. When people change of location, it 
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destroys social networks formerly existing in 
the sending places and it affects social capital 
in the receiving sectors. So, migration must 
be managed cautiously. Secondly, when 
networks of migrants have been established, 
migration is likely to continue even if initial 
incitation to migrate has disappeared. Thus, it 
is not necessarily sufficient to make 
economic incitation disappear to stop the 
migratory phenomenon. 
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Value of Alpha in 66 Countries (other European countries, as well as North American 
countries, Japan, Australia or New Zealand, have value of alpha below 20 %). Calculated by 
USDA-ERS, using 1996 data. 
 
Country Total  Food 
Expenditure (% total 
expenditures) 
Country Total  Food 
Expenditure (% total 
expenditures) 
Nigeria 72,97  Bahamas  35,73 
Albania 69,26  Jamaica    34,78 
Madagascar 65,88 Macedonia  34,73 
Vietnam 64,75 Russia  34,35 
Sri Lanka  63,55  Estonia  33,45 
Sierra Leone  62,09  Botswana  32,80 
Yemen 61,13  Argentina  32,79 
Bangladesh 56,05  Turkey  32,60 
Benin 55,40  Iran  32,55 
Malawi 53,35  Slovakia  32,06 
Senegal 53,35  Korea  31,64 
Mali 53,27  Belize    31,17 
Indonesia 50,62  Bulgaria  30,70 
Philippines 48,35  Poland  30,65 
Egypt  48,08  Peru 30,31 
Gabon 47,94  Venezuela  29,47 
Syria  47,92  Ecuador 29,09 
Pakistan 46,99 Thailand 28,56 
Congo 46,92  Bahrain    28,55 
Kenya 45,82  Mauritius  28,12 
Morocco  45,61  Swaziland 27,48 
Romania 45,26  Paraguay  27,27 
Ukraine 45,03 Mexico 26,63 
Cote d'Ivoire  44,32  Qatar  26,22 
Cameroon 43,80 Zimbabwe 25,58 
Guinea 43,69  Uruguay  25,25 
Moldova 43,45  Czech  Republic  25,00 
Bolivia 42,52  Portugal  23,23 
Lithuania 40,42  Chile  22,96 
Lebanon  39,33  Brazil 22,71 
Dominica   38,27  Hungary  22,54 
Jordan  37,67  Slovenia 21,34 
Tunisia  35,95  Greece 21,17 
 
Source : US Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/InternationalFoodDemand)  
 
 
 